

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.230
7 September 1965
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 7 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLED0

(Mexico)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K.P. JAIN

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Mr. H. PAC

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. P. MATEESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD
Mr. W.A. HAYNE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the two hundred and thirtieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) First of all I should like to thank the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Cernik, for his kindness in allowing me to take his place as the first speaker today.

The statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, at the 229th meeting on 2 September would seem to indicate that he is not clear about the real attitude of the Soviet delegation towards the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152) submitted by the United States. Although at the meeting on 31 August (ENDC/PV.228) we fully explained our attitude towards the United States approach to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as reflected in its draft treaty, nevertheless, inasmuch as the representative of the United States is still expecting further clarifications from us, we are prepared to give them.

First of all, allow me to recall what we said on 31 August on this question:

We pointed out that the Soviet Union sees in an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons a practical means of really stopping the process of the continuous extension of access to nuclear weapons, whether through the emergence of new nuclear Powers possessing their own nuclear weapons, or through access to them in the form of participation in collective ownership, collective use or collective control within the framework of a military alliance or in any other way. Only such a solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- one that does not allow of any loopholes or exceptions -- is of any real value for the cause of peace. We have insisted, we insist and we shall continue to insist on this.

Further, we noted with regret the fact that our Western colleagues do not treat the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons conscientiously. They are concentrating all their abilities and energy on manoeuvring in this matter in such a way as 'to have their cake and eat it', as the saying goes; that is, to have an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and at the same time to give the West German Bundeswehr access to nuclear weapons through its participation in the planned NATO multilateral nuclear force. The United States draft treaty to

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prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is a reflection of this kind of manoeuvre. The Western Powers must stop their manoeuvring around this question.

We pointed out once again that the proper solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons requires that an end be put to the spread of nuclear weapons in any form, whether directly through national ownership or indirectly-- that is, through participation in a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force and such-like. We stressed that national ownership of nuclear weapons and indirect access to them through participation in a NATO multilateral nuclear force are two forms of one and the same peace-jeopardizing process - the process of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which we are striving to stop. Both these ways, both these channels of the dissemination of nuclear weapons must be closed. No other approach can give us an acceptable solution of the problem. This aspect of principle should not be ignored by the Western Powers, if they really wish this question to be solved.

That is what we said about how the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons should be solved. If, however, the representative of the United States considers that what we have said is not sufficient, then the Soviet delegation can once again explain its attitude towards the document submitted by the United States of America.

The United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons provides for the banning of certain forms of dissemination: namely, the direct transfer of such weapons by nuclear to non-nuclear States, the transfer of such weapons through military alliances to the national control of non-nuclear States, and the creation by non-nuclear States of their own nuclear weapons. However, at the same time -- and we wish to emphasize this aspect of the matter -- the United States draft opens up possibilities of establishing a multilateral nuclear force and giving the Federal Republic of Germany and other non-nuclear countries members of NATO access to nuclear weapons within the framework of such a force. This is not simply our own interpretation of the United States draft -- this was said distinctly and clearly by Mr. Foster himself at the meeting of 31 August this year, when, replying very tardily to our question, he stated: "The treaty would not, however, preclude the establishment of nuclear arrangements -- such as a multilateral force within NATO..." (ENDC/PV.228, p. 38)

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Thus the United States and its NATO allies, as we see from their practical actions both inside and outside this Committee, are not even thinking of really solving the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The draft treaty submitted by the United States not only fails to eliminate the danger of the further spread of nuclear weapons but, as follows quite obviously from the text, is aimed at legalizing the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the participation of the West German revanchists, and thus at leaving open one of the channels of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. This is also borne out by the fact that, upon the insistence of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, negotiations are continuing in NATO for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force and for giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons. In the light of that fact we have to note that the Draft Treaty to prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons submitted in our Committee by the United States pursues purely propaganda aims and not the aim of achieving the necessary agreement.

Since at the present time the main practical danger of the spread of nuclear weapons is connected with the plan to establish a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the United States draft is unsound from the standpoint of solving the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. On that basis it is impossible to arrive to an agreement. That is our attitude in regard to the United States draft treaty.

As the Soviet Government has already stated repeatedly, the Soviet Union favours the conclusion of an effective international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which would close all direct and indirect channels for dissemination, including through military blocs, in the form of the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Such an agreement should provide for an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, into the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons, and not to give such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. The agreement should also provide for a similar undertaking by the non-nuclear Powers.

That is our conception of the basis of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

I will now turn to another matter.

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At the meeting of the Committee held on 31 August this year we pointed out that - "The general spirit pervading the statements of the representatives of the non-aligned countries, the considerations they have put forward which testify to the further development of their views on the questions under discussion, and the concrete proposals of the non-aligned States -- even though it may not be possible to agree with everything they said -- deserve attention and careful study." (ENDC/PV.228, p. 22)

We should like to note with satisfaction the constructive development of the views of the non-aligned States on the question of prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests, to the discussion of which they have devoted considerable attention in the Committee and, what is more important, on which they have put forward constructive ideas and proposals. In contrast to the static position of the United States, which continues to put forward its old demands for international inspection and thereby makes agreement on the question of prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests impossible to achieve, among the non-aligned States there have cropped up new ideas, considerations and proposals which contribute towards the solution of this problem.

In this connexion the Soviet delegation is of the opinion that the proposal made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, deserves attention. The proposal, put forward on 17 August of this year, was that the scope of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should be extended to cover underground nuclear weapon tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, and that as an additional measure the nuclear Powers should agree to a moratorium on all other underground nuclear weapon tests pending the achievement of agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Mr. Hassan said:

"... whatever the remaining differences are, political or technical, the Committee has before it various suggestions presented to it by the non-aligned delegations around this table, such as that for the extension of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, which the admitted capacities and capabilities of the existing national equipments are able to detect and identify ... As a complementary measure to the preceding one, we again proposed ... that there should be a voluntary moratorium by nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty." (ENDC/PV.224, pp. 9, 10)

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This proposal by the Government of the United Arab Republic, reflecting a realistic approach to a question which is ripe for solution, namely the need to put an end to underground nuclear tests, was supported on 2 September by the representative of Ethiopia, Lij Iru, who said:

"What is needed today is the political decision and the ability to accept minor risks in the expectation of making gains in the wider field of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.229, p. 16)

He went on:

"The Ethiopian delegation supports the proposal made at our meeting of 17 August by the leader of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, that there should be a voluntary moratorium by the nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty." (ibid.)

In raising this question we should like to point out once again that the Soviet Union is ready, as in the past, to reach immediately an agreement banning all underground nuclear weapon tests, on the basis of the use of national means of detecting nuclear explosions, which are quite adequate for monitoring such a ban. As the proposal of the United Arab Republic relates to the banning of a part of underground nuclear tests precisely under such conditions, and to the establishment of a moratorium on all other underground nuclear tests, the Soviet Union is prepared to meet the position of the United Arab Republic and to agree to the halting of underground nuclear weapon tests in that way.

We call on all the States, nuclear and non-nuclear, represented in the Committee--- and first and foremost, of course, on the United States --- to support this proposal, which would enable us to put an end immediately to any further nuclear weapon tests and, by so doing to block that dangerous channel of the nuclear arms race.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): The discussion that has taken place so far in our Committee can hardly be called encouraging. It is regrettable that the representatives of the NATO countries are obstinately striving to get our Committee to discuss proposals which cannot result in any progress towards the solution of the urgent problems of disarmament, as called for by a number of delegations in the Committee, and required by the serious situation which has come about in the world as a result of the aggressive actions of the United States in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and other parts of the world.

In the discussion which has taken place so far, great stress has been laid on achieving positive results in the negotiations on disarmament and on measures which if implemented would lead to a relaxation of international tension, to a strengthening of confidence in the relations between States, and to a slowing-down of the arms race. This aspect also determines the position of the Czechoslovak delegation in regard to the present work of the Committee. In its statement in the general debate the Czechoslovak delegation pointed out (ENDC/PV.222, pp. 34 et seq.) a number of measures the importance and urgency of which bring them to the forefront precisely at the present time.

Today I wish to revert to certain very necessary measures which the Committee should consider as a matter of priority. I should like to give first place to the proposal for the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States. Much attention has already been given to this question both in this Committee and in the disarmament discussions in other international bodies. However, the Western Powers, and in particular the United States of America, systematically and deliberately ignore this extremely urgent question and call it propaganda, as was done at our last meeting by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster.

But such an approach to the question of liquidating foreign military bases and withdrawing foreign armed forces from the territories of other States is not only unwise but dangerous. The intensification of the war in Vietnam fully confirms this. The presence of American troops and the spreading-out of aggressive military bases in South Vietnam constitute a hotbed of aggression and a serious threat to peace in that area and throughout the world. People are apparently beginning to realize the significance of this question even in the United States itself. It is not by chance

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that, among the conditions put forward by the United States for the opening of negotiations on Vietnam -- as Senator Mansfield said in his speech in the United States Senate on 1 September 1965 (New York Times, 2 September, p.2) -- there recently appeared also a clause concerning the withdrawal of all armed forces and the liquidation of bases in the whole of Vietnam, side by side with guarantees of non-intervention not only for Vietnam but also for Laos and Cambodia.

The mere fact that this clause appeared in the American proposals for the settlement of the situation in Vietnam shows how justified and extremely urgent is the demand for the immediate opening of negotiations on the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States, to which the socialist countries have been drawing the attention not only of this Committee but also of other international forums for several years. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation this demand should not be waved aside as propaganda but given the attention it deserves. If the United States side means its proposals to put an end to the war of aggression in Vietnam to be taken seriously, then this should be reflected accordingly also in the behaviour and statements of the United States delegation in our Committee. Otherwise we are compelled to regard the attitude of the United States delegation towards the consideration of this extremely urgent question as simply a manoeuvre for the purpose of screening from world public opinion the escalating American aggression in Vietnam.

It has been proved by many facts that the existence of foreign bases and the presence of foreign armed forces on the territories of other States has a negative influence on the general development of relations between States, on the heightening of international tension and on the intensification of the arms race. The delegations of the socialist countries, as well as the representatives of many non-aligned States, have repeatedly drawn attention to these facts. The existence of foreign military bases, the presence of armed forces on the territories of other States and the role assigned to them in the strategic plans of the Western Powers are a serious obstacle in solving the basic questions of general and complete disarmament, as well as in the negotiations on a number of specific measures aimed at reducing international tension and improving the general situation in the world.

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In the light of these facts the argument with which the Western Powers try to justify the presence of their military bases and armed forces on the territories of other States: namely, the assertion that their bases and armed forces are on the territories of other States with the consent of the governments of those countries, is absolutely unconvincing. I do not intend in this connexion to raise the question of the circumstances in which this "consent" is often given. From the point of view of the negotiations on disarmament the formal, legal status of bases and armed forces on the territories of other States is not decisive. What is decisive is their negative influence on the possibility of solving specific basic questions of disarmament - the fact that, unless agreement is reached on the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces placed on the territories of other countries, it will be impossible to make any progress in solving the basic questions of disarmament, to do away with mutual distrust in the relations between States, and to bring about a really effective relaxation of international tension.

The same applies to the assertion of the representatives of the Western Powers that the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of other States would lead to upsetting the military balance between the socialist and the capitalist States. It is precisely from the point of view of the mutual correlation of the forces of the socialist and the capitalist States that, as a result of rapid technical advances, the military importance of bases has substantially diminished. The delegations of the socialist countries have dealt with this question on many occasions during the previous negotiations and therefore I do not think it necessary to revert to it now.

As regards the assertion about upsetting the so-called military balance, I should like to make only one remark. What do the Western Powers mean by the concept of mutual balance? What, in their opinion, creates such a balance, and what upsets it? Over and over again it is asserted that, if military bases are being established and expanded by the West in any area of the world, the Western Powers regard this as lawful and are not in the least concerned about the consequences arising therefrom for the so-called military balance. But they reject any proposal for the liquidation of bases as a threat to this balance and as upsetting it.

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How this standard of comparison varies in practice is clearly shown by the actions of the United States of America in Vietnam, where of late there has been taking place not only a sharp increase in the strength of the United States armed forces but also the creation of a network of new military bases which -- as it turns out -- are far from being intended solely for the war of aggression against the people of Vietnam. Significant in this regard is the information recently published by the New York Times in an article by the well-known journalist, James Reston:

(continued in English)

"The United States bases and supply areas are being constructed on a scale far larger than is necessary to care for the present level of American forces -- therefore it is assumed that the build-up will continue well beyond what has been announced so far. In fact the United States base at Camranh, which was one of the best natural ports in Asia, is being developed into another Okinawa, not merely for the purposes of this war but also as a major power complex ..." (New York Times, 28-29 August 1965)

(continued in Russian)

This policy of expanding the network of American bases in Vietnam is being carried out under the pretext of "protecting" the peoples of Asia from Chinese expansion. These facts throw a clear light on the real aims of the United States of America in Vietnam and the whole area of South-East Asia. There the United States has taken upon itself the role of "protector" of the Asian peoples, despite the fact that not one of the peoples of that area has asked for such protection. The assertion of the United States that these actions are being carried out with the agreement, or even at the request, of the people who are passing themselves off as the government of South Vietnam makes no difference whatsoever in that regard.

Thus it becomes obvious what is the real purpose of American bases on foreign territories, and how just and urgent is the demand for the liquidation of those bases and the withdrawal of the armed forces stationed there.

In its work so far the Committee has devoted much attention to the question of measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The whole course of the discussion, however, has shown that there are still two concepts regarding the approach

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to the solution of this question which are absolutely opposed to each other. The delegation of the Czechoslovak Republic, like the delegations of other socialist countries, insist that a treaty on measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons should ensure a really consistent solution of this question. We base ourselves on the premise that the fundamental aim of such measures must be the maintenance of the status quo as regards the ownership, control and possibility of disposing of nuclear weapons.

A treaty on this subject must first of all prevent any further States, apart from the existing nuclear Powers, from participating in any way, directly or indirectly, individually or collectively, in the ownership, control and disposal of nuclear weapons or in the taking of decisions regarding their use. It must prevent the nationals of those States from participating in the handling of nuclear weapons or in any planning in the field of production of nuclear weapons, their use, siting and so on. In our opinion a treaty must not allow of any exceptions, privileges or discriminations in respect of any State whatsoever. It must guarantee equal status for all non-nuclear States without exception, irrespective of whether they are members of military groupings or not.

Our delegation fully shares the view that measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are incompatible with plans for the establishment of a so-called multilateral nuclear force or Atlantic nuclear force, or again the integration of nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO in any form which would give further States members of NATO any rights in the field of nuclear weapons which they do not have at present.

Yet that is precisely what the Western Powers are seeking to achieve. The draft treaty (ENDC/152) tabled on 17 August by the United States delegation and the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, at our 228th meeting fully confirm this. The Western Powers are in fact asking for the conclusion of a treaty which would prohibit the dissemination of nuclear weapons everywhere except in Western Europe. Such an approach cannot, of course, constitute an acceptable basis for negotiations that could lead to positive results. The submission of a draft based on

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such a position and so obviously ignoring the point of view of the socialist countries, which has been clearly stated on many occasions, does not testify to the existence of any real willingness or desire of the Western Powers to achieve an agreement.

The Western Powers must take a decision either in favour of the adoption of effective and consistent measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, which would not allow of any exceptions, or in favour of the plans for the integration of nuclear weapons within NATO, which would be incompatible with the non-dissemination of such weapons. If they take a decision in favour of the second alternative, they must also take upon themselves the responsibility for the serious consequences which such a step entails, not only in regard to developments in Europe but also in regard to a further intensification of the nuclear arms race.

The behaviour of the Western Powers is dictated by pressure on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany, whose leaders are straining every effort to gain access to nuclear weapons. The Czechoslovak delegation, like the delegations of other socialist countries, has shown by many facts what aims are being pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany in the matter of nuclear weapons. We know the irritation with which the Western Powers react whenever we point out the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany and its policy in the matter of nuclear weapons. But our position is based on facts which cannot be refuted. It is evident that the Federal Republic of Germany is confronting its NATO allies with ever-increasing demands. And the Western Powers are yielding to that pressure. But the Czechoslovak people paid a heavy price in earlier days for the policy of making concessions to the demands of German imperialism. That is why we reject such a policy in the most resolute manner.

We insist on the adoption of really effective measures which would prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form or in any way. We realize that measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons do not solve the problem of eliminating the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. Their adoption would merely be a first step which would help towards creating more favourable conditions for the solution of that problem. We consistently maintain the view that the threat of a nuclear war can be finally eliminated only by carrying out radical measures in the field of nuclear

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weapons, by liquidating nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The negotiations which have so far taken place on this question within the framework of general and complete disarmament have shown that its solution is meeting with opposition from the Western Powers, who are unwilling to accept the radical measures which could save mankind from the threat of a nuclear war.

We believe, however, that even in these circumstances some useful steps can be accomplished. One of them would be the achievement of an agreement to ban the use of nuclear weapons, or at least unilateral declarations by the nuclear Powers that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, as proposed by the Soviet Government (A/5827 and Corr.1). That would be a completely realistic measure which could be implemented without any great difficulty within the framework of partial measures. Such a step would appropriately complement an agreement on measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It would provide desirable evidence of the readiness of the nuclear Powers to embark on a course which would lead to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war.

That is why we fully support the initiative taken in this matter as early as 1961 by a large group of African and Asian Powers, headed by Ethiopia. On the basis of that initiative the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution (1649 (XVI)) calling for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. But the opposition of the Western Powers has so far made it impossible to give effect to this important measure. The difficulties encountered in solving this problem should not, however, cause the forces that are striving to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war to resign themselves to such a situation. On the contrary, they must redouble their efforts towards achieving agreement on this question.

An important measure the implementation of which, although only indirectly, would nevertheless considerably assist the efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and at the same time contribute towards improving the situation in the world would be the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The Czechoslovak delegation has already expressed its conviction that this problem could be solved without any great difficulty under conditions similar to those under which, in accordance with the Moscow Treaty, nuclear tests were banned in three environments. But this way is blocked by the Western Powers, who are continuing to insist on their demand for so-called on-site inspection.

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It seems, however, that there is still a possibility of a compromise solution, which would help to overcome the gap between the positions of the two sides on the question of the cessation of underground tests. In our opinion the way to such a solution is opened up by the initiative of the non-aligned countries (ENDC/145), and in particular by the idea put forward by the representative of the United Arab Republic at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee held on 17 August of this year. In his statement Mr. Hassan proposed an extension of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground nuclear tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, which the existing national equipments are able to detect and identify, and, as a complementary measure to this partial ban, he proposed that there should be voluntary moratorium by nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty (ENDC/PV.224, pp.9 and 10). This idea was supported by the representative of Ethiopia, Lij Imru, on 2 September (ENDC/PV.229, p.16).

The Czechoslovak delegation listened with great attention to the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, in which he expressed the support of the Soviet Government for this proposal of the United Arab Republic. We welcome this move by the Soviet Government as further important evidence of its desire to solve the problem of underground nuclear tests on the basis of a compromise. We consider that this important move by the Soviet Government opens up new opportunities for achieving positive results in our negotiations, namely on a question the importance of which has been rightly stressed in the statements made by the delegations of all the States represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

We should like to express the hope that the Western Powers also, and first and foremost the United States of America, will adopt such a position as would enable us, on the basis created by the valuable initiative of the United Arab Republic, to achieve results which would enable our Committee, in its report to the twentieth (anniversary) session of the United Nations General Assembly, to show at last that in the fourth year of its existence it has made a valuable contribution towards the solution of the most important problems of disarmament.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I shall of course want to study the statement made today by the representative of the Soviet Union. However, at this point I must note with regret the lack of understanding of our draft treaty (ENDC/152) displayed in his statement. He obviously failed to study the responses to his questions which I had given, and he persisted in attempting to substitute his responses for mine.

We remain convinced that there is no problem inherent in the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty which cannot be resolved in the mutual interest of all of us. If we cannot find the basis for agreement here and now, we certainly hope that we shall not lack early opportunities to continue the discussions thereon. Having finally come to grips with the divergent points of view which various delegations have on this matter, we must pursue our efforts to reach an agreement until such a treaty becomes an actual fact.

We want, of course, to study not only Ambassador Tsarapkin's statement but also Minister Cernik's statement on the test ban. I am sure that all representatives are aware of the long-standing position of the United States in opposition to an unverified moratorium. As I made clear on 2 September, our position is that we should seek an adequately-verified ban on all tests (ENDC/PV.229 pp.19, 23). We do not feel that half-measures, which may create suspicion throughout the world that violations might be occurring, could create good prospects for a stable agreement to ban all tests.

On another matter, our position with regard to the points made by the representative of Czechoslovakia is clear from earlier statements of my delegation; but with respect to troops and bases let me add one additional thought. The way to eliminate troops and bases is clearly to eliminate the threat which necessitates them. That is the purpose of our work in this Conference, and of the peaceful settlement which we seek for situations which create tensions around the world. We cannot put the cart before the horse. That would aggravate our problem, not solve it, and would actually add to the instability of a peace which is now so precariously preserved, for lack of a better way, through the balance of forces to which our colleague referred.

I propose today to speak on one aspect of the problem of concluding a non-proliferation agreement which appears to be of particular concern to some of the non-nuclear countries. I refer to the view that the obligations to be assumed by nuclear Powers should not be discriminatory and that they should match those assumed by non-nuclear countries. To assure this, it is suggested that it will be necessary for the nuclear Powers to undertake measures to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

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There can be no question of the position of the United States on this proposition. My Government is prepared to halt the nuclear arms race and to halt it now. We gave proof of this last year in the emphasis we gave to our proposals to explore a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/PV.120). We also proposed to cease all production of fissionable materials for weapons, and to transfer agreed amounts of such materials to non-weapons use (ibid.).

Let me review these measures briefly. Our proposal to explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of nuclear offensive and defensive strategic bombers and missiles is designed to halt the most destructive and expensive segment of the whole nuclear arms race. An agreement on this measure would be a major achievement in building confidence and in preparing the way for other steps. The production race having been halted, the door would then be open to actual reduction in such delivery vehicles.

We are ready to explore such a measure now. But whilst awaiting a constructive response from the Soviet Union we are attempting, in so far as is possible, to act in the spirit of this proposal. Thus, as I reported to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, we have given several examples of restraint on our part in the nuclear armaments field. These examples include plans to reduce the numbers of certain heavy bombers and to forego construction of certain missiles which had been included in our production plans (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.) But there are no real limits to the actions that we can take alone. For one thing, we have received no indications of similar self-restraint on the part of the Soviet Union; but even more important is the fact that significant progress in this area requires assurance of compliance, and for this a verified agreement is absolutely essential. It is time, high time, for the Soviet Union to respond more positively to this proposal. Our position is not frozen; we should welcome constructive suggestions from the Soviet Union or from any other countries.

Equally important is our long-standing proposal for a verified halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use and, in conjunction with such a halt, the transfer of sizeable, agreed quantities of fissionable material to peaceful non-weapons uses. As the Committee is aware, we have offered as an illustrative suggestion to transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235 if the Soviet Union would on its part transfer 40,000 kilogrammes to non-weapons use (ENDC/PV.191, p.9).

We are ready to negotiate such an agreement right now. Is it not high time for the Soviet Union to match our readiness to implement such a proposal? In our working paper on inspection of a fissionable materials cut-off (ENDC/134) we demonstrated that the verification of this measure would not involve onerous or excessively-intrusive inspection

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procedures. Announcements by nuclear Powers regarding cut-backs, such as those made last year, are welcome but are not likely to solve the problem. We hope that the Soviet Union will see its way clear before long to join us in an intensive examination of a cut-off agreement. Again on this as on other proposals, we should welcome Soviet and other suggestions.

We did not wait to table a non-proliferation agreement before addressing ourselves to these means of halting the nuclear arms race; nor do we intend to suspend further efforts to reach agreement on them until we have concluded a non-proliferation treaty.

Indeed, the measures I have reviewed are by no means the sum total of the West's extensive efforts to halt the arms race. Through extensive research programmes conducted under the auspices of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, we are continually examining existing positions and the possibilities of new proposals. In addition, looking forward to the day when we shall come to agreement on measures involving large-scale reductions in armament production, President Johnson, shortly after he assumed office, ordered an extensive examination of the possible economic problems that might accompany shifts in defence spending, or even general and complete disarmament.

The report on this subject, prepared by a special committee headed by Mr. Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, was made public yesterday, 6 September. In welcoming the report President Johnson said that what he found most encouraging was its conclusion that the heavy current commitment of the United Nations to defence was not a bar to rapid progress towards disarmament. My delegation expects to have copies of this report available for those representatives who may be interested.

That is our answer to the question of priorities. We do not agree with the suggestion that nuclear disarmament must precede a non-proliferation agreement. We are prepared to act first on any measure on which agreement is possible. In this we are guided by our experience with the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), which placed concrete inhibitions on the nuclear Powers and only theoretical ones on the non-nuclear countries. We welcome the wise and courageous statements made by the representatives of Mexico (ENDC/PV.224, p.30) and Ethiopia (ENDC/PV.229, pp.13, 14) with regard to priorities. We believe this Committee must deal simultaneously with proposals to halt the nuclear arms race and with proposals to prevent its spread.

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It has been implied in some of the statements made here that, by consenting to a non-proliferation agreement, the non-nuclear countries would be surrendering some leverage on the nuclear countries to force them into accepting measures of nuclear disarmament. In point of fact, however, further proliferation would inhibit nuclear disarmament, rather than encourage it. The best statement of this conclusion remains the oft-quoted statement of President Kennedy:

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons ... in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered through the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance of effective disarmament." (ENDC/102, p.5)

Let me be frank. The nuclear Powers cannot be forced into agreements, any more than can the non-nuclear Powers. We are dealing here with questions of security, where national interest is the primary guide to national action. But surely one thing is now amply clear: the basic interests of every country and the maintenance of world peace demand an end to the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. The United States has given unequivocal proof of its acceptance of that basic fact. What is needed now is evidence that the other side understands it too.

There is no question, therefore, of attempting to impose obligations on non-nuclear countries in return for maintaining the exclusive status of the nuclear Powers. In the first place, each of us must judge any proposed agreement, not by the standard of what someone else might or might not get out of it, but rather by whether the benefit to each of us in safeguarding world peace would exceed the cost. Secondly, and with specific regard to a non-proliferation agreement, it should be clear by now that we each stand to gain and that the so-called cost to any of us is hardly comparable.

I should like in this connexion to say something about the acceptance of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. I am referring now not primarily to safeguards applied to nuclear materials or equipment obtained through the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which the recipient State is required to accept IAEA safeguards. I am referring rather to the voluntary acceptance by a State of safeguards on its indigenous nuclear programme, including both materials and equipment, as is contemplated in article III of the United States Draft Treaty to prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

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There seems to be a misconception in some quarters that the IAEA actually has operational control of facilities and materials which are subject to the safeguards. That is not true. The IAEA safeguards system is

"... designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information ... are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." (Statute of the IAEA, Art.III A 5)

The system of safeguards has been specifically designed to avoid hampering a State's economic or technological development. Moreover, the inspectors are under instructions to implement the system in a manner designed to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. In large power reactors inspectors must, of course, have access at all times to the facilities, the equipment and the materials; but they must not interfere with the economic operation of the facilities. The recent experience of a private utility company in the United States with IAEA inspections has shown that they are not burdensome and that they in no way hamper economic operation of the reactor.

We know of no reason why any State which is willing to undertake not to manufacture nuclear weapons should not be willing also to accept IAEA or equivalent international safeguards, both to demonstrate its faithful compliance with its treaty commitments and to establish means of reassuring itself that other parties are also complying. Those international safeguards are not costly; they are not burdensome; they do not hamper the economic operation of reactors; they do not lead to the revelation of trade secrets. In short, they do not in any way interfere with a nation's peaceful nuclear activities.

The question has been raised by the distinguished representative of India of the need for safeguards on reactors, since the plutonium produced in a reactor is not useful for weapons until it has been processed through a chemical separation plant (ENDC/PV.223, pp. 19, 20). The IAEA safeguards system is designed to cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication plants, reactors and chemical separation plants. The reason for that is that diversion to clandestine military activity could occur at any point in the cycle. The more parts of the cycle the inspectors can observe, the more difficult it would be to hide such diversion.

To be sure, specific procedures for safeguards on all of the various types of nuclear facilities have not yet been developed. The IAEA regards the development of a safeguards system as a step-by-step matter, and up to now the first major step has been taken by the development of procedures for reactors. Authority now exists for inspections of other types of facilities, and procedures for those inspections will be developed as need arises.

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In our view, whatever may be the slight inconvenience occasioned by international nuclear safeguards, it is minuscule in comparison with the large contribution which their general acceptance would make to curbing nuclear proliferation. Given the practicability of these IAEA procedures and the fact that they are not really burdensome, it is difficult to understand why there should be any resistance to their application by any country. This is particularly true of non-nuclear countries, for whom the widespread application of safeguards would provide an assurance that other States were not making preparations to initiate a weapons programme.

Some have said that it is discriminatory to ask non-nuclear countries to accept safeguards on their peaceful activities as long as certain nuclear Powers do not do so. I might, of course, argue that this view misses the essential point: namely, that until a cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons is accepted, the application of safeguards to the peaceful activities of nuclear Powers would still leave their most important nuclear production facilities unsafeguarded. But in any case our draft treaty would not discriminate. In article III we have called on all parties, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, to co-operate in facilitating the application of such safeguards to peaceful activities. By inviting IAEA inspections of one of their large power reactors, the United States (ENDC/PV.172, p.17) and the United Kingdom have both taken a lead in preparing the ground for the widespread, non-discriminatory application of those safeguards. Agreement on our proposal to halt the production of all fissionable material for weapons use would remove any remaining obstacles to the IAEA safeguards on peaceful activities in the nuclear States. Those who are as anxious as we are to further this process should address themselves to the Soviet Union.

But, in the meantime, many States are planning to build power reactors which will unavoidably produce significant quantities of plutonium. In the absence of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on such reactors, suspicion is bound to arise that some diversion of plutonium to a future weapons programme is taking place. That is why a strong safeguards provision is necessary in a non-proliferation treaty. Rather than cast doubt on its necessity, therefore, non-nuclear States as well as nuclear Powers might question whether the provision we have suggested is strong enough to avert the threat which we already face and which may soon grow to dangerous proportions.

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Concerns over priorities or possible discrimination are not, of course, purely illusory. They do have a psychological and political basis, even if they are not well grounded in fact. But let us be clear on our objective. If we are serious about our resolve to halt the nuclear arms race, to begin the process of reduction in nuclear arsenals and to prevent nuclear spread, we must move along a broad front and we must seize every opportunity to take such steps as now seem feasible. The national interests of which I spoke will assure that no country will be placed in a disadvantageous position. What really is in question is whether we have the wisdom to see to it that all countries are protected and that peace is secured.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 230th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Gomez Robledo, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 9 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon